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Abstract
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points
in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away.
It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one that minimizes the total distance
to the voters. Yet, the voting rules often do not have access to the metric space M and
only see preference rankings induced by M . Consequently, they often are incapable of
selecting the optimal candidate. The distortion of a voting rule measures the worst-case
loss of the quality being the result of having access only to preference rankings. We extend
the idea of distortion to approval-based preferences. First, we compute the distortion of
Approval Voting. Second, we introduce the concept of acceptability-based distortion—the
main idea behind is that the optimal candidate is the one that is acceptable to most voters.
We determine acceptability-distortion for a number of rules, including Plurality, Borda,
k-Approval, Veto, the Copeland’s rule, Ranked Pairs, the Schulze’s method, and STV.
1 Introduction
We consider the classic election model: we are given a set of candidates, a set of voters—
the voters have preferences over the candidates—and the goal is to select the winner, i.e., the
candidate that is (in some sense) most preferred by the voters. The two most common ways
in which the voters express their preferences is (i) by ranking the candidates from the most to
the least preferred one, or (ii) by providing approval sets, i.e., subsets of candidates that they
find acceptable. The collection of rankings (resp. approval sets), one for each voter, is called a
ranking-based (resp. approval-based) profile. There exist a plethora of rules that define how to
select the winner based on a given preference profile, and comparing these election rules is one
of the fundamental questions of the social choice theory [3].
One such approach to comparing rules, proposed by Procaccia and Rosenschein [22], is
based on the concept of distortion. Hereinafter, we explore its metric variant [2]: the main idea
is to assume that the voters and the candidates are represented by points in a metric space M
called the issue space. The optimal candidate is the one that minimizes the sum of the distances
to all the voters. However, the election rules do not have access to the metric space M itself
but they only see the ranking-based profile induced by M : in this profile the voters rank the
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Figure 1: The relation between the fraction of voters approving the optimal candidate and the distortion
of AV, for the case when the approval radiuses of the voters have all equal lengths.
candidates by their distance to themselves, preferring the ones that are closer to those that are
farther. Since the rules do not have full information about the metric space they cannot always
find optimal candidates. The distortion quantifies the worst-case loss of the utility being effect
of having only access to rankings. Formally, the distortion of a voting rule is the maximum, over
all metric spaces, of the following ratio: the sum of the distances between the elected candidate
and the voters divided by the sum of the distances between the optimal candidate and the voters.
The concept of distortion is interesting, yet—in its original form—it only allows to compare
ranking-based rules. In this paper we extend the distortion-based approach so that it captures
approval preferences. In the first part of the paper we analyze the distortion of Approval Voting
(AV), i.e., the rule that for each approval-based profile A returns the candidate that belongs to
the most approval sets fromA. To formally define the distortion of AV one first needs to specify,
for each metric space M , what is the approval-based profile induced by M . Here, we assume
that each voter is the center of a certain ball and approves all the candidates within it. We
can see that each metric space induces a (possibly large) number of approval-based profiles—
we obtain different profiles for different lengths of radiuses of the balls. This is different from
ranking-based profiles, where (up to tie-breaking) each metric space induced exactly one profile.
Thus, the distortion of AV might depend on how many candidates the voters decide to approve.
Indeed, it is easy to observe that if each voter approves all the candidates, then the rule can
pick any of them, which results in an arbitrarily bad distortion. On the other hand, by an easy
argument we will show that for each metric space M there exists an approval-based profile A
consistent with M , such that AV for A selects the optimal candidate. In other words: AV can
do arbitrarily well or arbitrarily bad, depending on how many candidates the voters approve.
Our first main contribution is that we fully characterize how the distortion of AV depends
on the length of radiuses of approval balls. Specifically, we show that the distortion of AV is
equal to 3, when the lengths of approval radiuses of the voters are all equal and such that the
optimal candidate is approved by between 1/4 and 1/2 of the population of the voters (and this
is the optimal distortion for the case of radiuses of equal length). The exact relation between
the number of voters approving the optimal candidate and the distortion of AV is depicted in
Figure 1.
In the second part of the paper we explore the following related idea: assume that the goal
of the election rule is not to select the candidate minimizing the total distance to the voters,
but rather to pick the one that is acceptable for most of them. E.g., AV perfectly implements
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this idea. A natural question is how good are ranking-based rules with respect to this criterion.
To answer this question we introduce a new concept of acceptability-based distortion (in short,
ab-distortion). We assume that each metric space, apart from the points corresponding to the
voters and candidates, contains acceptability balls—one for each voter (as before, each voter is
the center of the corresponding ball). The optimal candidate is the one that belongs to the most
acceptability balls, and the ab-distortion distortion measures the normalized difference between
the numbers of balls to which the elected and the optimal candidates belong. The ab-distortion
is a real number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to selecting the optimal candidate and 1
is the worst possible value 1.
Among the ranking-based rules that we consider in this paper, the best (and the optimal)
ab-distortion is attained by Ranked Pairs and the Schulze’s method. It is an open question,
whether they are the only natural rules with this property. It is worth mentioning, that its ab-
distortion is closely related to the size of the Smith set, so in case it is small (in particular,
when the Condorcet winner exists) these rules have even better ab-distortion. We have found an
interesting result for the Copeland’s rule. Although in case of classic (distance-based) distortion
most Condorcet rules are equally good, this is no longer the case when acceptability is the
criterion we primarily care about. The ab-distortion of the Copeland’s rule is equal to 1, which
is the worst possible value. This rule is optimal only if the Condorcet winner exists (e.g. when
the metric space is one-dimensional). The distortion of scoring rules (Plurality, Borda, Veto,
k-approval) is significantly worse that for Ranked Pairs. An another surprising result is the
distortion of STV—while this rule is known to achieve a very good distance-based distortion,
its ab-distortion is even worse than for Plurality (denoting the number of candidates asm, STV
and Plurality achieve the ab-distortion of 2
m−1
2m
and m−1
m
, respectively). In case of all these rules
the worst-case instances were obtained in one-dimensional Euclidean metric spaces. Our results
are summarized in Table 1.
2 Preliminaries
For each set S by 2S andΠ(S)we denote, respectively, the powerset of S and the set of all linear
orders over S. By S∁ we denote the complement set of S, and by S∗—the set of all vectors with
the elements from S. For each two sets S1, S2 and a function f : S1 → 2
S2 by Rf : S2 → 2
S1
we denote the function defined as follows:
∀y ∈ S2 Rf (y) = {x ∈ S1 : y ∈ f(x)}
For convenience we assume that [−∞; +∞] denotes the affinely extended real number sys-
tem (the set of real numbers R with additional symbols +∞, and −∞). We take the following
convention for arithmetical operations:
∀a ∈ R
a
±∞
= 0 ∀a ∈ (0; +∞]
±a
0
= ±∞.
1The reader might wonder why we define the ab-distortion as a difference rather than as a ratio (as it is done
for the classic definition of the distortion). Indeed, we first used the ratios in our definition, but then it was very
easy to construct instances where any rule had the distortion of +∞. Further, we found that these results do not
really speak of the nature of the rules but rather are artifacts of the used definition. Consequently, we found that
the considering the difference gives more meaningful results.
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Rule Distance-based distortion ([1; +∞]) Ab-distortion ([0; 1])
Each rule ≥ 3 ≥ ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ > 1
≥ 1
2
otherwise
Plurality 2m− 1 m−1
m
Borda 2m− 1 m−1
m
k-approval ∞ 1
Veto ∞ 1
Copeland 5 1 for ℓ > 1
1
2
otherwise
Ranked Pairs 5 ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ > 1
1
2
otherwise
Schulze’s Rule 5 ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ > 1
1
2
otherwise
STV O(lnm) 2
m−1−1
2m−1
Table 1: The comparison of the distortion for various ranking-based rules. The results in the left column
(for the distance-based distortion) are known in the literature. The results for ab-distortion are new to
this paper; here, m denotes the number of the candidates and ℓ is the size of the Smith set.
Expressions 0
0
, ±∞
±∞
, 0 · ±∞ and ±∞−±∞ are undefined.
2.1 Our Metric Model
An election instance is a tuple (N,C, d, λ), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of voters,
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}, is the set of candidates, d : (N∪C)
2 → R is a distance function (d allows
us to view the candidates and the voters as points in a pseudo-metric space), and λ : N → 2C
is an acceptability function, mapping each voter i ∈ N to a subset of candidates that i finds
acceptable. We assume that λ is nonempty, i.e., for each i ∈ N , λ(i) 6= ∅, and that is local
consistent—for each i ∈ N , ca, cb ∈ C, if ca ∈ λ(i) and d(i, cb) ≤ d(i, ca), then cb ∈ λ(i).
Often we will also require that λ satisfies a stronger condition, called global consistency—for
each i, j ∈ N , ca, cb ∈ C, if ca ∈ λ(i) and d(j, cb) ≤ d(i, ca), then cb ∈ λ(j). Intuitively,
local-consistency means that for each voter i ∈ N we can associate λ(i) with a ball with the
center at the point of this voter. A voter i ∈ N considers a candidate cj to be acceptable for him,
cj ∈ λ(i), if and only if cj lies within the ball. Such a ball will be further called the acceptability
ball and its radius—the acceptability radius. Then, global consistency can be interpreted as an
assumption that all the acceptability radiuses have equal lengths.
We will sometimes slightly abuse the notation: by saying that an instance satisfies local
(global) consistency we will mean that the acceptability function in the instance satisfies the
respective property.
By I, we denote the set of all election instances. Since issue spaces are often argued to be
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Euclidean spaces with small numbers of dimensions, we additionally introduce the following
notation: for each k ∈ N let Ek denote the set of all the instances where the elements of N and
C are associated with points from Rk, and d is the Euclidean distance.
2.2 Preference Representation
In most cases, it is difficult for the voters to explicitly position themselves in the issue space,
and often even the space itself is unknown. Therefore, we will consider voting rules that take
as inputs preference profiles induced by election instances, instead of instances themselves. We
consider two classic approaches to represent preferences.
Ranking-based profiles. A ranking-based profile induced by an election instance I = (N,C, d, λ)
is the function <I : N → Π(C), mapping each voter to a linear order over C such that
for all i ∈ N and all ca, cb ∈ C if d(i, ca) < d(i, cb) then ca <i cb. For each voter i ∈ N ,
the relation <I(i) (for convenience also denoted as <i, whenever the instance is clear
from the context) is called the preference order of i. If for some cx, cy ∈ C it holds that
cx <i cy, we say that i prefers cx over cy.
Approval-based profiles. An approval-based profile of an election instance I = (N,C, d, λ)
is a locally consistent acceptability function AI : N → 2
C . We say that a candidate cx is
approved by a voter i ∈ N if cx ∈ A(i). We will say that the approval-based profile is
truthful if for all i ∈ N it holds that A(i) = λ(i).
Let us introduce some additional useful notation. Let P : C∗ → N be a function mapping
vectors of distinct candidates to sets of voters as follows:
P ((ci1, ci2, ..., cik)) = {v ∈ N : ci1 <v ci2 <v . . . <v cik}
For convenience, we will write P (ci1, ci2, ..., cik) instead of P ((ci1, ci2 , ..., cik))
2. Note that
for all ca, cb ∈ C we have P (ca, cb) ∩ P (cb, ca) = ∅ and P (ca, cb) ∪ P (cb, ca) = N .
We say that ca dominates cb if |P (ca, cb)| >
n
2
and that ca weakly dominates cb if |P (ca, cb)| ≥
n
2
. We say that a candidate cx Pareto-dominates a candidate cy if there holds that |P (cx, cy)| = n.
A candidate cy is Pareto-dominated if there exists a candidate cx who Pareto-dominates cy.
2.3 Definitions of Voting Rules
An election rule (also referred to as a voting rule) is a function mapping each preference profile
to a set of tied winners. We distinguish ranking-based rules—taking ranking-based profiles as
arguments, and approval-based rules—defined analogously. Among approval-based rules, we
focus on Approval Voting (AV)—the rule that selects those candidates that are approved by most
voters. In the remaining part of this subsection we recall definitions of the ranking-based rules
that we study in this paper.
2It will always be clear from the context whether in the inscription P (x), x should be interpreted as a vector or
as a candidate.
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Positional scoring rules For a given vector ~s = (α1, α2, α, αm), the scoring rule implemented
by ~s works as follows. A candidate ca gets αi points from each voter j who puts ca in the ith
position in <j . The rule elects the candidates whose total number of point, collected from all
the voters, is maximal. Some well-known scoring rules which we will study in the further part
of this work are the following:
Plurality: ~s = (1, 0, . . . , 0),
Veto: ~s = (1, . . . , 1, 0),
Borda: ~s = (m− 1, m− 2, . . . , 1, 0),
k-approval: ~s = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, 0, . . . , 0) (for 1 ≤ k ≤ m).
The Copeland’s Rule The Copeland’s rule elects candidates cw who dominate at least as
many candidates as any other candidate. More formally, a candidate cw is a winner if and only
if:
∀cx ∈ C |{c : |P (cw, c)| >
n
2
}| ≥ |{c : |P (cx, c)| >
n
2
}|
Ranked Pairs Ranked Pairs works as follows: first we sort the pairs of candidates (ci, cj) in
the descending order of the values |P (ci, cj)|. Then, we construct a graph G where the vertices
correspond to the candidates. We start with the graph with no edges; then we iterate over the
sorted list of pairs—for each pair (ci, cj) we add an edge from ci to cj unless there is already a
path from cj to ci inG. If such a path exists, we simply skip this pair. Clearly, the so-constructed
graph G is acyclic. The source nodes of G are the winners.
The Schulze’s Rule The Schulze’s rule works as follows: let the beatpath of length k from
candidate ca to cb be a sequence of candidates cx1 , cx2, . . . , cxk−1 such that ca dominates cx1 ,
cxk−1 dominates cb and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}, cxi dominates cxi+1 . Let the strength of
the beatpath be the minimum of values P (ca, cx1), P (cx1, cx2), . . . , P (cxk−1, cb). By p[ca, cb] we
denote the maximum of strenghts of all beatpaths from ca to cb. Candidate cw is the winner if
and only if for each candidate c it holds that p[cw, c] ≥ p[c, cw].
STV Single Transferable Vote (STV) works iteratively as follows: if there is only one candi-
date, elect this candidate. Otherwise, eliminate the candidate who has the least points according
to the Plurality rule and repeat the algorithm.
Note that the aforementioned rules are irresolute by definition. Further, we did not specify
the tie-breaking rule used when sorting edges in Ranked Pairs and when eliminating candidates
in STV. We will make all these rules resolute by using the lexicographical tie-breaking rule,
denoted by <lex.
2.4 Measuring the Quality of Social Choice
In this section we formalize the concept of distortion that, on the intuitive level, we already
introduced in Section 1.
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Distance-based approach A natural idea to relate the quality of a candidate c with the sum of
the distances from this candidate to all the voters. The lower this sum is, the higher the quality.
Following this intuition, the distortion of a voting rule ϕ in instance I ∈ I, is defined as follows
(below, co denotes the optimal candidate for I):
DI(ϕ) = max
p∈PI
∑
i∈N d(i, ϕ(p))∑
i∈N d(i, co)
,
wherePI is the set of profiles induced by I (either ranking or approval, depending on the domain
of ϕ). D(ϕ) ∈ [1; +∞].
This approach can be applied to any rule discussed so far. For ranking-based rules it has
already been widely studied in the literature, hence in the further part we will focus on AV.
Acceptability-based approach Now we present an alternative way to measure the quality
of candidates, based on the acceptability function. Intuitively, the more voters a candidate c
is acceptable for, the higher his quality. Besides, we would like the maximal possible quality
not to depend on the number of voters. Therefore, we define the acceptability-based distortion
(ab-distortion, in short) of a voting rule ϕ in instance I ∈ I as the following expression:
DI(ϕ) = max
p∈PI
Rλ(co)−Rλ(ϕ(p))
n
,
where PI is the set of profiles induced by I (either ranking-based or approval-based, depending
on the domain of ϕ). Clearly, the ab-distortion is always a value from [0; 1]. By definition,
Approval Voting always elects an optimal candidate in terms of ab-distortion. Thus, we will
consider our acceptability-based measure only for ranking-based rules.
LetE be an expression that can depend on characteristics of an instance (e.g., on the number
of candidates, or size of the Smith set). We say that the (acceptability-based) distortion of a rule
ϕ isE, if for each instance I ,DI(ϕ) ≤ E and for eachE there is an instance I withDI(ϕ) = E.
3 Distortion of Approval Voting
In this section we analyze the distance-based distortion of Approval Voting (AV)—hereinafter
we denote AV by ϕAV .
We start by showing that in the most general case, if we do not make any additional assump-
tions about the acceptability function, the distortion of AV can be arbitrarily bad.
Proposition 3.1. There exists an instance I ∈ E1 such thatDI(ϕAV ) = +∞.
This result is rather pessimistic. However, one could ask a somehow related question—does
there for each instance I always exist an approval profile consistent with I that would result in
a good distortion? In contrast to Proposition 3.1, here the answer is much more positive.
Proposition 3.2. For each instance I ∈ I, there is an approval based profile p consistent with
I such that ϕ(p) is the optimal candidate (minimizing the total distance to voters).
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Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 show that for each metric spaceM there always exists two approval
profile A1, A2 consistent withM such that for A1 AV selects the worst possible candidate, and
for A2 it selects the optimal one—since A1 and A2 are both consistent withM , they only differ
in the sizes of approval balls. This formally shows that the performance of AV strongly depends
on how many candidates the voters decide to approve. Below, we provide our main result of
this section—assuming that all the acceptability balls have radiuses of the same length, we show
the exact relation between this length of approval radiuses and the distance-based distortion of
AV. In particular, we show that the best approval radius is such that the optimal candidate is
approved by between 1/4 and 1/2 fraction of all the voters.
Definition 3.3. An approval-based profileA induced by an instance I is p-efficient for p ∈ [0; 1]
if RA(co) = pn.
In words, a profile is p-efficient if the number of voters who approve the optimal candidate
is the p fraction of n.
Theorem 3.4. For each globally consistent p-efficient instance I , we have the following results:
DI(ϕAV ) ≤


+∞ for p ∈ {0, 1}
1−p
p
for p ∈ (0; 1
4
]
3 for p ∈ [1
4
; 1
2
]
2−p
1−p
for p ∈ [1
2
; 1).
The above function is depicted in Figure 1.
All these bounds are attained for instances in E1. While we omit the formal proof of this
statement, in order to give the reader a better intuition, we illustrate hard instances for different
values of p in Figure 2.
Finally, for completeness, we give an analogue of Proposition 3.2, but for globally-consistent
instances.
Proposition 3.5. For each instance I ∈ I, there exists an approval profile p globally consistent
with I , such that ∑
i∈N d(i, ϕ(p))∑
i∈N d(i, co)
≤
11
3
.
4 AB-Distortion of Ranking Rules
Recall that the ab-distortion of a voting rule is a value from [0; 1], proportional to the differ-
ence between the number of voters accepting the optimal candidate and the number of voters
accepting the winner. By definition, this value equals 0 for AV (provided the approval profile is
truthful). In this section we analyze the ab-distortion of ranking-based rules.
We start by proving the lower bound on the ab-distortion of any ranking-based voting rule.
Theorem 4.1. For each ℓ ∈ N and each ranking-based rule ϕ, there exists a globally consistent
instance I such that:
8
1ǫ
cw
c1
1
c2
1
cn−2p−1
1
co
pn
pn+ 1
p ∈ [0; 1
4
] R = 0 n→ +∞
R
R
R + ǫ R + ǫ R
c1
c2
co cwn
2
− pn
n
2
− pn
pn pn
p ∈ [1
4
; 1
2
]
R R + ǫ Rc1
co cw
n− pn pn
p ∈ [1
2
; 1]
Figure 2: Instances achieving the bounds given in Theorem 3.4. White points correspond to groups of
voters, black points—to the candidates. Here, cw is the winner of the election and co is the optimal
candidate, cw <lex co <lex c1 <lex c2 <lex . . .. R is the length of the acceptability radius. Since R is
common for all the voters, the instances are globally consistent.
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1. the size of the Smith set in the ranking-based profile induced by I equals ℓ,
2. DI(ϕ) =
{
ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ ≥ 2
1
2
for ℓ = 1.
In the subsequent part of this section we will assess the distortion of specific voting rules,
specifically looking for one that meets the lower-bound from Theorem 4.1.
4.1 Condorcet Rules
We start by looking at Condorcet consistent rules. Note that the lower bound found in Theorem 4.1
is promising, as it depends on the size of the Smith set. In particular, if ℓ = 1, this bound equals
1
2
. Our first goal is to determine, whether Condorcet rules meet this bound.
Theorem 4.2. Let I be an instance where a Condorcet winner exists. Then, for each Condorcet
consistent rule ϕ we have DI(ϕ) ≤
1
2
. This bound is achievable for a globally consistent
I ∈ E2.
From the above theorem, we get that for ℓ = 1 each Condorcet election method matches
the lower bound from Theorem 4.1. Now we will prove that there exists election rules, namely
Ranked Pairs and the Schulze’s rule, which match this bound for each ℓ.
Theorem 4.3. For each election instance I , the ab-distortion of Ranked Pairs and the Schulze’s
method is equal to:
• ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ ≥ 2,
• 1
2
for ℓ = 1,
where ℓ is the size of the Smith set of I .
As we can see, there is no rule with a better ab-distortion than these two rules. Yet, it is not
a feature of all the Condorcet methods. As we will see, even for the well-known Copeland’s
rule, the possible pessimistic distortion is much worse.
Theorem 4.4. For each ǫ > 0, there exists a globally consistent instance I ∈ E2 for which the
ab-distortion of the Copeland’s rule exceeds 1− ǫ.
4.2 Scoring Rules
Let us now move to positional scoring rules. Here, we obtain significantly worse results than
for Ranked Pairs and the Schulze’s rule. A general tight upper bound for the ab-distortion of
any scoring rule remains an open problem. Below we provide bounds that are tight for certain
specific scoring rules.
Theorem 4.5. For a scoring rule ϕ defined by vector ~s = (s1, . . . , sm) the ab-distortion of ϕ
satisfies:
1. DI(ϕ) = 1, if s1 = . . . = sm,
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2. DI(ϕ) ≤
maxi,j |si−sj |
maxi,j |si−sj |+mini,j |si−sj |
, otherwise.
The bound obtained in Theorem 4.5 is not tight in general. For example, for Plurality we
have a tighter estimation.
Theorem 4.6. The ab-distortion of Plurality is m−1
m
. This bound is achieved for globally con-
sistent instances in E1.
Yet, for a number of scoring rules the bound from Theorem 4.5 is tight. Below, we give
some sufficient conditions.
Proposition 4.7. The bound from Theorem 4.5 is tight for each scoring rule satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sm,
2. ∀1≤i≤m−1 s1 − s2 ≤ si − si+1
even for globally consistent instances in E1.
Theorem 4.5 and Proposition 4.7 imply the ab-distortion for a number of scoring rules.
Corollary 4.8. There exists a globally consistent instance I ∈ E1, for which:
1. the ab-distortion of k-approval is 1
1+0
= 1,
2. the ab-distortion of Veto is 1
1+0
= 1,
3. the ab-distortion of Borda is m−1
m−1+1
= m−1
m
.
4.3 Iterative rules
All scoring rules that we considered have poor ab-distortion, and in particular are considerably
worse than Condorcet rules (especially for instances with Condorcet winners).
Interestingly, STV in terms of acceptability, behaves worse even than Plurality. This is
somehow surprising since for distance-based distortion, STV is better than any positional scor-
ing rules, and only slightly worse than Condorcet rules.
Theorem 4.9. The ab-distortion of STV is 2
m−1−1
2m−1
.
The above bound is tight even in one-dimensional Euclidean spaces. It is also tight if we
restrict ourselves to global consistent instances. There, the hard instances that we found use
(m− 2)-dimensional Euclidean space.
Proposition 4.10. The bound from Theorem 4.9 is tight for locally consistent instances from E1
and globally consistent instances from Em−2.
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5 Related Work
The spatial model of preferences is quite popular in the social choice and political science
literature. For example seminal works studying spacial models we refer the reader to [10, 21,
11, 12, 18, 19, 24].
The concept of distortion was first introduced by Procaccia and Rosenschein [22]. In their
work they did not assume the existence of a metric space, but rather used a generic cardinal
utility model (where the voters can have arbitrarily utilities for candidates). This model was
later studied by Caragiannis and Procaccia [8] and Boutilier et al. [6]. Recently, Benade´ et al.
[5] introduced the concept of distortion for social welfare functions, i.e., functions mapping
voters preferences to rankings over candidates, and Benade et al. [4] adapted and used the
concept of distortion in the context of participatory budgeting to evaluate different methods of
preference elicitation. The studies of the concept of distortion in metric spaces were initiated
by Anshelevich et al. [2], and then continued by Anshelevich and Postl [1], Feldman et al. [13],
Goel et al. [15], and Gross et al. [16].
The analysis of the distortion forms a part of a broader trend in social choice stemming from
the utilitarian perspective. For classic works in welfare economics that discuss the utilitarian
approach we refer the reader to the article of Ng [20] and the book of Roemer [23]. This ap-
proach has also recently received a lot of attention from the computer science community. Apart
from the papers that directly study the concept of distortion that we discussed before, examples
include the works of Filos-Ratsikas and Miltersen [14], Branzei et al. [7], and Chakrabarty and
Swamy [9].
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the concept of distortion of voting rules to approval-based pref-
erences. This extension allows to compare rules that take different types of input: approval sets
and rankings over the candidates. To the best of our knowledge, only very few formal methods
are known that allow for such a comparison. We are aware of only one work that formally
relates these two models: Laslier and Sanver [17] proved that in the strong Nash equilibrium
Approval Voting selects the Condorcet winner, if such exists.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we have determined the distortion of Approval Voting,
and explained how this distortion depends on voters’ approval sets. We have shown that the
socially best outcome is obtained when voters approve not too many and not too few candidates.
If the lengths of voters’ acceptability radiuses are all equal, the best distortion is obtained when
the approval sets are such that between 1
4
and 1
2
of the voters approve the optimal candidate.
Second, we have defined a new concept of acceptability-based distortion (ab-distortion).
Here, we assume that the voters have certain acceptability thresholds; the ab-distortion of a
given ruleϕmeasures howmany voters (in the worst-case) would be satisfied from the outcomes
of ϕ. We have determined the ab-distortion for a number of election rules (our results are
summarized in Table 1), and reached the following conclusions. The analysis of the classic
and the acceptability-based distortions both suggest that Condorcet rules perform better than
scoring and iterative ones. Further, our acceptability-based approach suggests that Ranked Pairs
and the Schulze’s rule are particularly good rules, in particular significantly outperforming the
12
Copeland’s rule. Thus, our study recommends Ranked Pairs or the Schulze’s method as rules
that robustly perform well for both criteria (total distance, and acceptability). The question
whether they are the only natural ranking-based rules performing well for both criteria is open.
Approval Voting is also a very good rule that can be considered an appealing alternative to them,
provided the sizes of the approval sets of the voters are appropriate.
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A Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1. There exists an instance I ∈ E1 such thatDI(ϕAV ) = +∞.
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1
c1 c2
n
Figure 3: Illustration of the hard instance used in the proof of Proposition 3.1. The white point indi-
cates the position of all the voters, and black points correspond to the candidates. The length of each
acceptability radius is 1—as it is the same for all the voters, the instance is globally consistent.
Proof. Consider the instance I from Figure 3. We have two candidatesC = {c1, c2}, c2 <lex c1,
and n voters. The voters are identical—for each i ∈ N we have d(i, c1) = 0, and d(i, c2) = 1
(thus c1 <i c2), and they all approve all the candidates.
In I , c1 is the optimal candidate, yet Approval Voting picks c1 and c2 which, together with the
fact that c2 <lex c1, implies that c2 is the winner. Thus, we get that DI(ϕAV ) =
n
0
= +∞.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proposition 3.2. For each instance I ∈ I, there is an approval based profile p consistent with
I such that ϕ(p) is the optimal candidate (minimizing the total distance to voters).
Proof. Consider an instance I , and let co be an optimal candidate in I . Consider the following
approval-based profile consistent with I: each voter approves co and all the candidates more
preferred to co, but does not approve any candidate less preferred than co. Candidate co gets n
votes. Thus, co will be the winner, unless some other candidate, call it c, also received n votes
and is preferred by the tie-breaking rule. If this is the case, then c must Pareto dominate co,
which means that c is also an optimal candidate. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4
In the proof we will also use the following simple inequality:
Lemma A.1. For each positive numbers a, b, c, d such that a ≥ b, c ≥ d we have that:
a+ c
b+ c
≤
a+ d
b+ d
Proof. For each positive numbers a, b, c, d such that a ≥ b, c ≥ d, we have:
0 ≤ (a− b)(c− d) ⇐⇒
ad+ bc ≤ ac+ bd ⇐⇒
ab+ ad+ bc + cd ≤ ab+ ac + bd+ cd ⇐⇒
(a+ c)(b+ d) ≤ (a+ d)(b+ c) ⇐⇒
a+ c
b+ c
≤
a+ d
b+ d
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Theorem 3.4. For each globally consistent p-efficient instance I , we have the following results:
DI(ϕAV ) ≤


+∞ for p ∈ {0, 1}
1−p
p
for p ∈ (0; 1
4
]
3 for p ∈ [1
4
; 1
2
]
2−p
1−p
for p ∈ [1
2
; 1).
The above function is depicted in Figure 1.
Proof. Let I be a globally consistent p-efficient instance. Assume that p /∈ {0, 1} (otherwise,
the upper bound +∞ is obtained directly from the definition of distance-based distortion). Let
co and cw denote, respectively, the optimal candidate in I and the winner returned by Approval
Voting. As I is globally consistent, there exists r ∈ R which is the length of acceptability
radiuses of all the voters.
We first provide a few basic inequalities, which will be used in the further part of the proof.
Wewill refer to these inequalities using their numbers—this will make the steps of our reasoning
transparent. As cw is the winner of the voting, we have:
pn = |RA(co)| ≤ |RA(cw)| (1)
From the definition of the voting radius:
∀S ⊆ RA(co)
∁ |S|r ≤
∑
v∈S
d(v, co) (2)
∀S ⊆ RA(cw) |S|r ≥
∑
v∈S
d(v, cw) (3)
∀S ⊆ N 0 ≤
∑
v∈S
d(v, co) (4)
From trivial set properties:
|RA(co)|+ |RA(cw)| − |RA(co) ∩RA(cw)|+ |(RA(co) ∪RA(cw))
∁| = n (5)
|(RA(co) ∪ RA(cw))
∁|
(5)
= n− |RA(co)| − |RA(cw)|+ |RA(co) ∩ RA(cw)|
(1)
≤ n− 2pn+ |RA(co) ∩RA(cw)| (6)
|RA(co) ∩RA(cw)| ≤ |RA(co)| (7)
From the triangle inequality:
∀v ∈ N d(v, cw) ≤ d(v, co) + d(co, cw) (8)
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∀v ∈ N d(co, cw) ≤ d(v, co) + d(v, cw) (9)
∀v ∈ N d(co, cw)− d(v, cw)
(9)
≤ d(v, co) (10)
∀S ⊆ RA(cw) |S|(d(co, cw)− r)
(10),(3)
≤
∑
v∈S
d(v, co) (11)
From Lemma A.1:
∀a, b, c, d ∈ R+, a ≥ b, c ≥ d
a + c
b+ c
≤
a + d
b+ d
(12)
a + c
b+ c
≤
a
b
(13)
The further part of the proof will be split into three cases:
Case 1 d(co, cw) ≤ r,
Case 2 r ≤ d(co, cw) ≤ 2r, and
Case 3 2r ≤ d(co, cw).
For each p, the final worst-case distortion is the maximum of the worst-case distortions in all
these three cases.
Analysis of Case 1. The following inequality holds:
d(co, cw) ≤ r. (14)
In this case we have:
DI(ϕAV ) =
∑
v∈N d(v, cw)∑
v∈N d(v, co)
(8)
≤
∑
v∈N d(v, co) + nd(co, cw)∑
v∈N d(v, co)
. (15)
As the numerator is greater than the denumerator (because DI(ϕAV ) ≥ 1):
DI(ϕAV )
(2),(12)
≤
|RA(co)
∁|r + nd(co, cw)
|RA(co)∁|r
(14)
≤
|RA(co)
∁|r + nr
|RA(co)∁|r
=
(n− pn) + n
n− pn
=
2− p
1− p
. (16)
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Analysis of Case 2. The following inequalities hold:
2r ≥ d(co, cw) ≥ r. (17)
In such case, we assess the distortion as follows:
DI(ϕAV ) =
∑
v∈N d(v, cw)∑
v∈N d(v, co)
=
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, cw) +
∑
v/∈RA(cw)
d(v, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(cw)
d(v, co)
(8)
≤
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, cw) +
∑
v/∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(cw)
d(v, co)
(3)
≤
|RA(cw)|r +
∑
v/∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(cw)
d(v, co)
=
|RA(cw)|r +
∑
v∈RA(co)\RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v∈RA(co)\RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co)
.
As the numerator is greater than the denumerator (because DI(ϕAV ) ≥ 1):
DI(ϕAV )
(4),(13)
≤
|RA(cw)|r +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co)
(2),(12)
≤
|RA(cw)|r + |(RA(cw) ∪RA(co))
∁|r + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |(RA(cw) ∪RA(co))∁|r
=
|RA(cw)|r + |(RA(cw) ∪RA(co))
∁|r + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)∩RA(co)
d(v, co) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)\RA(co)
d(v, co) + |(RA(cw) ∪ RA(co))∁|r
(11)
≤
|RA(cw)|r + |(RA(cw) ∪RA(co))
∁|r + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)
|RA(cw) ∩ RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)\RA(co)
d(v, co) + |(RA(cw) ∪ RA(co))∁|r
(2)
≤
|RA(cw)|r + |(RA(cw) ∪ RA(co))
∁|r + |RA(cw)
∁|d(co, cw)
|RA(cw) ∩RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) + |RA(cw) \RA(co)|r + |(RA(cw) ∪RA(co))∁|r
=
|RA(cw)|r + |(RA(cw) ∪ RA(co))
∁|r + |RA(cw)
∁|r + |RA(cw)
∁|(d(co, cw)− r)
|RA(cw) ∩ RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) + (n− |RA(co)|)r
(1)
≤
nr + |(RA(cw) ∪RA(co))
∁|r + (n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
|RA(cw) ∩ RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) + (n− pn)r
(6)
≤
nr + (n− 2pn + |RA(co) ∩RA(cw)|)r + (n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
|RA(cw) ∩ RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) + (n− pn)r
=
2nr − 2pnr + |RA(co) ∩ RA(cw)|r + (n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
|RA(cw) ∩ RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) + (n− pn)r
=
2nr − 2pnr + |RA(co) ∩ RA(cw)|(2r − d(co, cw)) + |RA(co) ∩RA(cw)|(d(co, cw)− r)
|RA(cw) ∩ RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) + (n− pn)r
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+
(n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
|RA(cw) ∩ RA(co)|(d(co, cw)− r) + (n− pn)r
(13)
≤
2nr − 2pnr + |RA(co) ∩ RA(cw)|(2r − d(co, cw)) + (n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
(n− pn)r
=
2n− pn
n− pn
+
−pnr + |RA(co) ∩RA(cw)|(2r − d(co, cw)) + (n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
(n− pn)r
(7),(17)
≤
2− p
1− p
+
−pnr + pn(2r − d(co, cw)) + (n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
(n− pn)r
=
2− p
1− p
+
pn(r − d(co, cw)) + (n− pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
(n− pn)r
=
2− p
1− p
+
(n− 2pn)(d(co, cw)− r)
(n− pn)r
=
2− p
1− p
+
(1− 2p)(d(co, cw)− r)
(1− p)r
.
For p ≥ 1
2
the second part of the final sum is not positive, so we have:
2− p
1− p
+
(1− 2p)(d(co, cw)− r)
(1− p)r
≤
2− p
1− p
.
On the other hand, for p ≤ 1
2
we have:
2− p
1− p
+
(1− 2p)(d(co, cw)− r)
(1− p)r
(17)
≤
2− p
1− p
+
(1− 2p)(2r − r)
(1− p)r
=
2− p
1− p
+
1− 2p
1− p
=
3− 3p
1− p
= 3.
Analysis of Case 3. The following inequality holds:
2R ≤ d(co, cw). (18)
First, let us observe that in this case sets RA(co) and RA(cw) are disjoint:
RA(co) ∩ RA(cw) = ∅ (19)
. It also holds that:
p
(1),(5)
≤
1
2
.
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Then we can limit the distortion (partially analogically as in Case 2) as follows:
DI(ϕAV ) =
∑
v∈N d(v, cw)∑
v∈N d(v, co)
=
∑
v∈RA(co)
d(v, cw) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, cw) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, cw)∑
v∈RA(co)
d(v, co) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co)
(8)
≤
∑
v∈RA(co)
d(v, co) + |RA(co)|d(co, cw) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, cw)∑
v∈RA(co)
d(v, co) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co)
+
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |(RA(co) ∪RA(cw))
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(co)
d(v, co) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co)
.
(20)
As the numerator is greater than the denumerator (because DI(ϕAV ) ≥ 1):
DI(ϕAV )
(4),(13)
≤
|RA(co)|d(co, cw) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co)
+
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |(RA(co) ∪RA(cw))
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) +
∑
v/∈RA(co)∪RA(cw)
d(v, co)
(2),(12)
≤
|RA(co)|d(co, cw) +
∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |(RA(co) ∪ RA(cw))∁|r
+
|(RA(co) ∪ RA(cw))
∁|r + |(RA(co) ∪RA(cw))
∁|d(co, cw)∑
v∈RA(cw)
d(v, co) + |(RA(co) ∪ RA(cw))∁|r
(3),(11)
≤
|RA(co)|d(co, cw) + |RA(cw)|r
|RA(cw)|(d(co, cw)− r) + |(RA(co) ∪ RA(cw))∁|r
+
|(RA(co) ∪ RA(cw))
∁|r + |(RA(co) ∪RA(cw))
∁|d(co, cw)
|RA(cw)|(d(co, cw)− r) + |(RA(co) ∪RA(cw))∁|r
(19)
=
(n− |RA(cw)|)d(co, cw) + (n− |RA(co)|)r
|RA(cw)|(d(co, cw)− r) + (n− |RA(cw)| − |RA(co)|)r
=
(n− |RA(cw)|)d(co, cw) + (n− |RA(co)|)r
|RA(cw)|(d(co, cw)− 2r) + (n− |RA(co)|)r
(1)
≤
(n− pn)d(co, cw) + (n− pn)r
pn(d(co, cw)− 2r) + (n− pn)r
=
(1− p)(d(co, cw) + r)
p(d(co, cw)− r) + (1− 2p)r
=
2(1− p)(d(co, cw) + r)
2p(d(co, cw)− r) + (2p− 1)(d(co, cw)− r) + (1− 2p)(d(co, cw) + r)
=
2(1− p)
(4p− 1)d(co,cw)−r
d(co,cw)+r
+ 1− 2p
.
Now we can easily see that:
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(18)
≤
d(co, cw)− r
d(co, cw) + r
< 1.
Hence, for p ∈ [1
4
; 1
2
] we can continue our calculations as follows:
2(1− p)
(4p− 1)d(co,cw)−r
d(co,cw)+r
+ 1− 2p
≤
2(1− p)
(4p− 1)1
3
+ 1− 2p
=
6(1− p)
4p− 1 + 3− 6p
=
6(1− p)
2− 2p
= 3.
For p ∈ [0; 1
4
] we can continue the calculations in a different way:
2(1− p)
(4p− 1)d(co,cw)−r
d(co,cw)+r
+ 1− 2p
≤
2(1− p)
4p− 1 + 1− 2p
=
2(1− p)
2p
=
1− p
p
.
Summarizing the results for the particular cases. Finally, we have the following results:
1. For p ∈ {0, 1}: +∞.
2. For p ∈ (0; 1
4
]: max(2−p
1−p
, 3, 1−p
p
) = 1−p
p
.
3. For p ∈ [1
4
; 1
2
]: max(2−p
1−p
, 3, 3) = 3.
4. For p ∈ [1
2
; 1): max(2−p
1−p
, 2−p
1−p
) = 2−p
1−p
.
The hard instances for different values of p are illustrated in Figure 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proposition 3.5. For each instance I ∈ I, there exists an approval profile p globally consistent
with I , such that ∑
i∈N d(i, ϕ(p))∑
i∈N d(i, co)
≤
11
3
.
Proof. Let us consider a globally consistent preference approval-based profile A induced by I
satisfying the following conditions:
1. at least n/4 voters approve an optimal candidate co,
2. the length of acceptability radiuses R is the shortest that satisfies the condition above.
If the number of voters approving co is less than
n
2
then A is p-efficient for some p ∈ [1
4
; 1
2
] and
the statement is implied directly by Theorem 3.4. Suppose then that p > 1
2
. It means that there
exists subsets of voters S ⊆ N , such that |S| < n
4
and for each i ∈ RA(co) \ S we have that
d(i, co) = R, while for each i ∈ S we have that d(i, co) < R.
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As RA(cw) ≥ RA(co), we have that there exists a voter approving both co and cw, hence
d(co, cw) ≤ 2R. Then from the triangle inequality we obtain the following result:∑
v∈N d(v, cw)∑
v∈N d(v, co)
≤
∑
v∈N d(v, co) + nd(co, cw)∑
v∈N d(v, co)
= 1 +
nd(co, cw)∑
v∈N d(v, co)
= 1 +
nd(co, cw)∑
v∈N\S d(v, co) +
∑
v∈S d(v, co)
≤ 1 +
nd(co, cw)
|N \ S|R + 0
≤ 1 +
nd(co, cw)
3
4
nR
≤ 1 +
2nR
3
4
nR
=
11
3
.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Theorem 4.1. For each ℓ ∈ N and each ranking-based rule ϕ, there exists a globally consistent
instance I such that:
1. the size of the Smith set in the ranking-based profile induced by I equals ℓ,
2. DI(ϕ) =
{
ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ ≥ 2
1
2
for ℓ = 1.
.
Proof. First, let us consider the case when ℓ ≥ 2. Note that ϕ does not depend neither on
the acceptability function nor on the specific distance values in the metric space. We will now
construct a set of ℓ instances I = {I1, I2, . . . , Iℓ} such that for each instance Ii the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. The number of candidatesm equals ℓ.
2. The voters are divided into groups G(i,1), G(i,2), . . . , G(i,ℓ)—each group contains
n
ℓ
voters
and corresponds to a single point in the metric space.
3. The ranking-based preferences of the voters from each group are the same and form a
cyclic shift of the vector (c1, c2, . . . , cℓ).
4. The voters from group G(i,k) have ranking
3
ci−k+1 < . . . < cℓ < c1 < . . . < ci−k,
and accept the first k candidates from the above ranking (hence, all the voters accept ci
and only voters from group G(i,ℓ) accept ci+1).
For each instance we have n/ℓ voters with preferences c1 < . . . < cℓ, n/ℓ voters with preferences
cℓ < c1 < . . . < cℓ−1, etc. Hence, the ranking-based preference profile induced by each instance
is the same subject to the permutation of the voters. Consequently, w.l.o.g., we can assume that
3For the sake of simplicity, in the proof we sometimes use the notation ci, G(i,k), Ii also for i, k < 1 or for
i, k > ℓ—in these cases, we mean the intuitive modulo notation ((i − 1) mod ℓ) + 1, ((k − 1) mod ℓ) + 1.
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in each instance the winner elected by ϕ is the same. Besides, one can easily verify that in each
instance all the candidates are in the Smith set.
Suppose that ϕ elects candidate ci. Then we take instance Ii−1 as a witness—here, the
optimal candidate is ci−1, acceptable for n voters, and candidate ci is acceptable only for n/ℓ
voters from G(i−1,ℓ). Thus, for this instance we obtain the ab-distortion of 1 − 1/ℓ = ℓ−1/ℓ. To
complete the proof for the case when ℓ ≥ 2, we need to show that it is possible to construct the
instances from I using globally consistent acceptability functions.
Each instance Ii can be constructed through the following procedure:
1. Put all the candidates in a metric space Rℓ−1 so that they are vertices of a regular (ℓ-1)-
simplex with all edges equal to 1.
2. Set the acceptability radius of all the voters to the length of the circumradius of the sim-
plex; let R denote the length of this radius.
3. For each k, we locate n/ℓ voters from G(i,k) in the following way. Consider the subset of
k candidates acceptable for these voters. These candidates are also vertices of a (k − 1)-
simplex. Put the voters from G(i,k) in the circumcenter of this (k − 1)-simplex.
The construction for ℓ = 3 is illustrated in Figure 4.
Now we will show that for each i, k, the construction of G(i,k) is correct—we need to verify
the following conditions:
Cond 1: The distance from each candidate ci−k+1, . . . , ci to G(i,k) does not exceed R,
Cond 2: The distance from any other candidate to G(i,k) exceeds R,
Cond 3: Ranking ci−k+1 < . . . < cℓ < c1 < . . . < ci−k is consistent with the metric space
for the voters from G(i,k).
Recall that for any regular k-simplex with length of edges equal to 1 the length of the circum-
radius is equal to
√
k
2(k+1)
and the height of the simplex is equal to
√
k+1
2k
(for k > 0).
Directly from these formulas we have some simple properties that hold for any regular k-
simplex and n-simplex, both with the length of edges equal to 1, k < n:
Property 1: The circumradius of the k-simplex is smaller than the the circumradius of the
n-simplex,
Property 2: The height of the k-simplex is greater than the circumradius of the n-simplex.
Proof of Cond 1: Since R is the circumradius of the (ℓ− 1)-simplex and the distance from
any candidate ci−k+1, . . . , ci to G(i,k) equals the circumradius of a (k − 1)-simplex for k ≤ ℓ,
then from Property 1 we have that this distance does not exceed R.
Proof of Cond 2: Consider a candidate cx outside of the set {ci−k+1, . . . , ci}. This candidate
together with candidates ci−k+1, . . . , ci are vertices of a k-simplex. Consider now the height of
this simplex dropped from cx. From the properties of regular simplexes the foot of this height
is the circumcenter of the (k − 1)-simplex with vertices ci−k+1, . . . , ci. Thus, this height equals
the distance from cx to G(i,k). From Property 2 we have that this distance is greater than R.
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c1
c2
c3
g1
g3
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I2
c1
c2
c3
g1
g3
g2
I3
c1
c2
c3
g1
g3
g2
Figure 4: The construction of I for ℓ = 3. White points correspond to the groups of voters, black
ones correspond to the candidates. Circles mean acceptability spheres of the voters—as their length is
common for all the voters, instances are globally consistent
Proof of Cond 3: From Cond 1 and Cond 2 we have that candidates ci−k+1, . . . , ci are closer
to G(i,k) than any other candidate. Hence, they need to be put at the top of the rankings of all
the voters from G(i,k). Moreover, each such a ranking is consistent with the metric space we
constructed (all candidates from {ci−k+1, . . . , ci} have the same distance to G(i,k), and similarly
all the candidates outside of this set). In particular, the ranking ci−k+1 < . . . < cℓ < c1 < . . . <
ci−k is consistent with the metric.
Now, let us move to the case when ℓ = 1. Here, we construct the following two instances,
I1 and I2. In both instances we have two candidates, c1 and c2, placed in the one-dimensional
Euclidean space in points 0 and 3, respectively. Further:
1. In I1 we have n/2 + 1 voters placed in point 1, and n/2 − 1 voters placed in point 3. The
length of the acceptability radius for all the voters is equal to 2, hence, all voters find c2
acceptable, and only n/2 + 1 of them approve c1.
2. In I2 we put n/2 + 1 voters in point 0, and n/2− 1 in point 2. Similarly as in the previous
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cx
cy cz
n
2
− 1
n
4
+ 1 n
4
Figure 5: A hard instance witnessing the bound from Theorem 4.2 for ℓ = 1. White points correspond to
groups of voters, black—to the candidates. As the length of the radius is common for all the acceptability
balls, the instance is globally consistent.
case, we set the length of the acceptability radius to 2. Here, c1 and c2 are acceptable for,
respectively, n and n/2− 1 voters.
Any deterministic rule cannot distinguish I1 from I2, so the winner will be the same in both
instances. Thus, in one of them, we will get the ab-distortion of 1/2.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Theorem 4.2. Let I be an instance where a Condorcet winner exists. Then, for each Condorcet
consistent rule ϕ we have DI(ϕ) ≤
1
2
. This bound is achievable for a globally consistent
I ∈ E2.
Proof. Let cw be the winner and co be the optimal candidate. Since we assumed that the Con-
dorcet candidate exists in I , we have that cw weakly dominates co. Then, we have:
n
2
≤ |P (cw, co)| = n− |P (co, cw)|
Thus, |P (co, cw)| ≤
n
2
. Further, we have that:
|Rλ(co)| − |Rλ(cw)|
= |Rλ(co) \Rλ(cw)|+ |Rλ(co) ∩Rλ(cw)|
− |Rλ(cw) \Rλ(co)| − |Rλ(co) ∩ Rλ(cw)|
= |Rλ(co) \Rλ(cw)| − |Rλ(cw) \Rλ(co)|
≤ |Rλ(co) \Rλ(cw)| ≤ P (co, cw) ≤
n
2
.
This completes the first part of the proof.
The hard instance is illustrated in Figure 5. We have four candidates C = {cx, cy, cz, cc}.
There are n
2
− 1 voters with preferences cx < cc < cy, cz, approving only cx,
n
4
+ 1 voters with
rankings cy < cc < cx, cz, approving only cy, and
n
4
voters with preferences cz < cc < cx, cy,
approving only cz. Candidate cc is the Condorcet winner and the optimal candidate is cx. The
distortion of each rule electing cc is
1
2
− 1
n
, which is arbitrarily close to 1
2
.
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 4.3
In the proof of the theorem, we will use the following definitions:
Definition A.2. Let the immunity set of instance I be the set of candidates such that each
candidate ca from this set satisfies the following condition for each cb ∈ C: if cb dominates ca,
then there exists a beatpath from ca to cb which strength is greater or equal to P (cb, ca).
Definition A.3. The election rule is immune if for each instance it elects a candidate from the
immunity set.
Note that for each instance the immunity set is the subset of the Smith set. Indeed, consider
any election instance I . Let ca ∈ C belong to the immunity set of I and cb belong to the Smith
set of I . If ca weakly dominates cb, then ca belongs to the Smith set. Otherwise, there exists a
beatpath from ca to cb. The last element of this beatpath dominates cb, hence it belongs to the
Smith set. If the ith element of the beatpath belongs to the Smith set, then so does the i − 1th
element (which dominates the ith one). Finally, we have that ca dominates the first element on
the beatpath, hence ca belongs to the Smith set.
Now we would like to prove the following lemma:
Lemma A.4. The ab-distortion of each immune ranking-based election rule ϕ is equal to:
• ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ ≥ 2,
• 1
2
for ℓ = 1,
where ℓ is the size of the Smith set of considered instance.
Proof. Let us denote the Smith set of the considered instance as S and let cw be the winner
according to ϕ. We have that:
|Rλ(co)| − |Rλ(cw)| ≤ |Rλ(co) \Rλ(cw)| ≤ |P (co, cw)|.
In the further part of the proof we will upper bound |P (co, cw)|. As the immunity set is a
subset of the Smith set, it holds that cw ∈ S. Let us consider two cases:
Case 1: Candidate cw weakly dominates co. Then using the same reasoning as in the proof of
Theorem 4.2 we get the bound of 1/2. In this case we get the thesis, since for ℓ ≥ 2
we have that 1
2
≤ ℓ−1
ℓ
.
Case 2: Candidate co dominates cw. Then we have:
|P (cw, co)| ≤ |P (co, cw)|.
We continue the analysis of Case 2. From the properties of the immunity set, there exists
a vector of candidates (cx1, cx2 , . . . , cck−2) for some k ∈ N, such that cw dominates cx1 , cxk−2
dominates co and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 3} cxi dominates cxi+1 . Besides, this vector satisfies the
following inequalities:
|P (co, cw)| ≤ |P (cw, cx1)|,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 3} |P (co, cw)| ≤ |P (cxi, cxi+1)|,
|P (co, cw)| ≤ |P (cxk−2, co)|.
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Summing up both sides of these k − 1 inequalities, we have that:
(k − 1)|P (co, cw)| ≤ |P (cw, cx1)|+
∑
1≤i≤k−3
|P (cxi, cxi+1)|+ |P (cxk−2, co)|.
This is equivalent to:
k|P (co, cw)| ≤ |P (co, cw)|+ |P (cw, cx1)|+
∑
1≤i≤k−3
|P (cxi, cxi+1)|+ |P (cxk−2, co)| ⇐⇒
|P (co, cw)| ≤
|P (co, cw)|+ |P (cw, cx1)|+
∑
1≤i≤k−3 |P (cxi, cxi+1)|.+ |P (cxk−2, co)|
k
Now let us consider the numerator in the right-hand side of the above inequality. Clearly,
each of the k elements of this sum can be upper-bounded by the number of the voters, n.
However, observe that a voter i ∈ N cannot be counted more than k−1 times, as her preferences
are transitive and all the considered two-element vectors together make a cycle. Thus, we can
upper-bound the sum by (k − 1)n, and so we get that |P (co, cw)| ≤
k−1
k
n.
As cw ∈ S and co dominates cw, then also co ∈ S and, consequently, for each i we have that
cxi ∈ S. Therefore, k ≤ |S|. Finally, we get that:
|Rλ(co)|
n
−
|Rλ(cw)|
n
≤
(k − 1)n
kn
=
k − 1
k
≤
|S| − 1
|S|
The fact that this upper-bound is tight follows directly from Theorem 4.1.
Having this lemma proved, the proof of the main theorem is quite simple:
Theorem 4.3. For each election instance I , the ab-distortion of Ranked Pairs and the Schulze’s
rule is equal to:
• ℓ−1
ℓ
for ℓ ≥ 2,
• 1
2
for ℓ = 1,
where ℓ is the size of the Smith set of I .
Proof. Wewill prove that both Ranked Pairs and the Schulze’s rule are immune. Then the result
will follow directly from Lemma A.4.
Consider an election instance I , and let cRP be the winner according to Ranked Pairs in I ,
and c be some other candidate. Assume that c dominates cRP . From the properties of Ranked
Pairs, we know that the edge between c and cRP has not been added by the election algorithm
to the graph. Hence, there must have existed a path in this graph from cRP to c, which had
been added before pair (c, cRP ) was considered. Vertices on this path clearly form a beatpath
from cRP to c. Besides, each edge on this path (ci, cj) satisfies P (ci, cj) ≥ P (c, cRP ), as it was
considered by the algorithm before edge (c, cRP ). Hence, the strength of this beatpath from cw
to c is greater of equal to P (c, cRP ) and, consequently, cRP belongs to the immunity set of I .
Now, let us denote the winner according to the Schulze’s rule by cS . Assume that c domi-
nates cS. Then p[c, cS] ≥ P (c, cS). On the other hand, from the properties of the Schulze’s rule,
we know that p[cS, c] ≥ p[c, cS]. Hence, there exists a beatpath from cS to c with the strength
greater or equal to p[c, cS], and, consequently, also to P (c, cS). As a result, cS belongs to the
immunity set of I .
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A.8 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Theorem 4.4. For each ǫ > 0, there exists a globally consistent instance I ∈ E2 for which the
ab-distortion of the Copeland’s rule exceeds 1− ǫ.
Proof. Let us fix ǫ > 0, and consider the following instance I with n > 2
ǫ
voters and three
candidates, C = {c1, c2, c3}, c2 <lex c1, c3. We put the candidates in R
2 so that they are all
vertices of an equilateral triangle. The length of the acceptability radius R is the same for all
the voters, and equals the length of the circumradius of the triangle. Finally, let us describe the
positions of the voters: we put n
2
− 1 of them in the same point as c1 and set their preferences to
c1 < c2 < c3 (they approve only c1). We put
n
2
− 1 voters in the middle of the segment between
c1 and c3 and set their preferences to c3 < c1 < c2 (they approve c1 and c3). The remaining 2
voters are located in the circumcenter and have preferences c2 < c3 < c1 (they approve c1, c2,
and c3). This instance is illustrated in Figure 6.
In this instance, c1 is the optimal candidate, approved by n voters. However, we have that c1
dominates c2, c2 dominates c3 and c3 dominates c1. Hence, all the candidates are elected by the
Copeland’s rule and we need to use the lexicographical tie-breaking rule to choose the winner—
which finally picks c2, approved only by 2 voters. This gives the ab-distortion of 1− 2/n, which
for n > 2
ǫ
is greater than 1− ǫ.
c1
c2
c3
n
2
− 1
n
2
− 1
2
Figure 6: The hard instance used in the proof of Theorem 4.4. White points correspond to groups of
voters, black points—to candidates. Circles represent acceptability balls of the voters.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Theorem 4.5. For a scoring rule ϕ defined by vector ~s = (s1, . . . , sm) the ab-distortion of ϕ
satisfies:
1. DI(ϕ) = 1, if s1 = . . . = sm,
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2. DI(ϕ) ≤
maxi,j |si−sj |
maxi,j |si−sj |+mini,j |si−sj |
, otherwise.
Proof. Let cw be the winner elected by ϕ and co be the optimal candidate. Let us consider
the highest possible difference ψ between the number of points gained by cw and co. Clearly
ψ ≥ 0. Besides, we know that for all voters from P (co, cw) candidate cw gained less points than
co. Further, candidate cw could gain from each voter from this group at least mini,j |si − sj | =
p points less than co. On the other hand, by considering the voters from P (cw, co) we infer
that the highest possible difference in scores gained by the two candidates equals maxi,j |si −
sj||P (cw, co)| = q|P (cw, co)|. Finally we have the following inequality:
0 ≤ ψ ≤ −p|P (co, cw)|+ q|P (cw, co)|
= −p|P (co, cw)|+ q(n− |P (co, cw)|)
= qn− (p+ q)|P (co, cw)|
Note that p + q = 0 is equivalent to the condition s1 = . . . = sm. Assume now that p + q > 0.
In such a case we have that:
|P (co, cw)| ≤
q
p + q
n
Further, as in the first displayed inequality in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we get that:
|Rλ(co)| − |Rλ(cw)| ≤ |Rλ(co) \Rλ(cw)| ≤ |P (co, cw)|.
Thus, the ab-distortion of ϕ does not exceed q
p+q
.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Theorem 4.6. The ab-distortion of Plurality is m−1
m
. This bound is achieved for globally con-
sistent instances in E1.
Proof. Note that the winner elected by Plurality needs to be the closest candidate for n
m
voters.
Hence, from the non-emptiness and local consistency of the acceptability function, we have that
c is acceptable for at least n
m
voters. Thus, the distortion does not exceed 1 − 1
m
= m−1
m
. This
bound is tight for the instance constructed as follows:
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be the set of candidates, c1 <lex c2 <lex . . . <lex cm. We divide
the voters into m equal-size groups, each putting a different candidate on the top position in
their preference rankings. All the candidates are acceptable for voters voting for c1, and all the
candidates except for c1 are acceptable for the remaining voters. he illustration of a globally
consistent instance in E1 satisfying the above conditions is presented in Figure 7.
In this instance each candidate gains m
n
points and the winner is c1 (due to the lexicograph-
ical tie-breaking rule). The optimal candidates are c2, . . . , cm, and they are acceptable for n
voters. Hence, the distortion is m−1
m
.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 4.7
Proposition 4.7. The bound from Theorem 4.5 is tight for each scoring rule satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
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R− ǫ R R
c1 n
m
c2, . . . , cm n
m
, . . . , n
m
Figure 7: The hard instance used in the proof of Theorem 4.6. White points correspond to groups of
voters, black—to the candidates. For the clarity of the presentation, candidates c2, . . . , cm and voters
voting for them are associated with the same points. R is the length of each acceptability radius. As this
length is common for all the voters, the instance is globally consistent.
R + ǫc1 c2, . . . , cm
n
1. s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sm
ǫ R ǫ
s1−sm
2s1−s2−sm
c1
s1−s2
2s1−s2−sm
c2
c3, . . . , cm
2. ∀1≤i≤m−1 s1 − s2 ≤ si − si+1
Figure 8: The hard instances used in the proof of Proposition 4.7. White points correspond to groups of
voters, black points correspond to the candidates. R is the length of each acceptability radius. As this
length is common for all the voters, the instance is globally consistent.
1. s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sm,
2. ∀1≤i≤m−1 s1 − s2 ≤ si − si+1
even for globally consistent instances in E1.
Proof. Note that for the scoring rules satisfying the conditions of the proposition we have that
maxi,j |si− sj| = s1− sm andmini,j |si− sj| = s1− s2. Let us use the same notation as in the
proof of Theorem 4.5: p = s1 − s2, q = s1 − sm.
First let us consider the case when s1 = . . . = sm, and consequently p+q = 0. In such case,
the bound 1 is achieved by the following instance withm candidates, cm <lex c1, . . . , cm−1. All
the voters have preferences c1 < . . . < cm and approve only c1. This instance is illustrated in
the upper row of Figure 8. The optimal candidate is c1, approved by n voters. However, all the
candidates received the same number of points, and therefore the winner is cm, approved by no
voter.
In the further part of the proof we assume that p+ q > 0. Then the bound from Theorem 4.5
is q
p+q
= s1−sm
2s1−s2−sm
.
Now consider the following instance. We havem candidates, C = {c1, . . . , cm}, c2 <lex c1,
and n voters divided into two groups: s1−sm
2s1−s2−sm
n of them have preferences c1 < c2 < . . . < cm
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and only c1 is acceptable for them, and the remaining
s1−s2
2s1−s2−sm
n voters have preferences c2 <
. . . < cm < c1 with all the candidates being acceptable. An illustration of a globally consistent
instance in E1 satisfying the above conditions is given in the lower row of Figure 8.
In this instance c2 gains s1 points from
s1−s2
2s1−s2−sm
n voters and s2 points from
s1−sm
2s1−s2−sm
n
voters. The total number of points that c2 received is:
s1
s1 − s2
2s1 − s2 − sm
n+ s2
s1 − sm
2s1 − s2 − sm
n =
s1(s1 − s2) + s2(s1 − sm)
2s1 − s2 − sm
n
=
s21 − s1s2 + s1s2 − s2sm
2s1 − s2 − sm
n =
s21 − s2sm
2s1 − s2 − sm
n.
On the other hand, c1 gains s1 points from
s1−sm
2s1−s2−sm
n voters and sm points from
s1−s2
2s1−s2−sm
n
voters. Its total score is equal to:
s1
s1 − sm
2s1 − s2 − sm
n + sm
s1 − s2
2s1 − s2 − sm
n =
s1(s1 − sm) + sm(s1 − s2)
2s1 − s2 − sm
n
=
s21 − s1sm + s1sm − s2sm
2s1 − s2 − sm
n =
s21 − s2sm
2s1 − s2 − sm
n
Since candidates c3, . . . , cm gain less points than c2 (as they are farther away from each voter
than c2 and it holds that s1 ≥ . . . ≥ sm), none of them can become the winner. Thus, c2 is the
winner of the election due to the lexicographical tie-breaking.
The optimal candidate is c1, and is acceptable for n voters, while c2 only for
s1−s2
2s1−s2−sm
n of
them. Hence, the distortion is equal to s1−sm
2s1−s2−sm
.
A.12 Proof of Theorem 4.9
Theorem 4.9. The ab-distortion of STV is 2
m−1−1
2m−1
.
Proof. Let cw be the winner according to STV. Note that, the winner is the only candidate that
survived to the the last round and in this round gains n votes. The number of rounds equalsm.
Note that if a candidate in some round gains k points (according to Plurality), then in the
next round it gains at most 2k points. Indeed, otherwise this candidate would need to gain
at least k + 1 points transferred from the removed candidate, so STV would not remove the
candidate with the least number of points, a contradiction. Consequently, we have that cw, who
has n points after m rounds, needs to get at least n
2m−1
points in the first round. Similarly as
in case of Plurality, from the non-emptiness and local consistency of the acceptability function,
we have that cw is acceptable for at least
n
2m
voters. Hence, the distortion does not exceed
1− 1
2m−1
= 2
m−1−1
2m−1
. We will prove the tightness in Proposition 4.10.
A.13 Proof of Proposition 4.10
Proposition 4.10. The bound from Theorem 4.9 is tight for locally consistent instances from E1
and globally consistent instances from Em−2.
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c1
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n
2
1. A locally consistent instance from E1.
n
2
n
8
n
4
n
8
c4
c1
c3 c2
2. A globally consistent instances from Em−2.
Figure 9: The hard instances used in the proof of Theorem 4.9. White points correspond to groups of
voters, black points—to the candidates. In the upper instance c1 is acceptable for all the voters, and cm
is acceptable only for the voters from the first group to the left.
Proof. First, we construct a locally consistent instance in E1. We have m candidates C =
{c1, . . . , cm}, cm <lex c1, . . . , cm−1. The candidates cm, c1, . . . , cm−1 are associated respectively
with points 1, 2, 4, 8, . . . , 2m. The voters are divided into m groups; the first group consists of
n
2m−1
voters, and for each i ≥ 2 the i -th group consists of n
2m−i+1
voters. These groups also
also associated, respectively, with the points 1, 2, 4, 8, . . . , 2m. Candidate c1 is acceptable for
all the voters, and cm is acceptable only for the
n
2m−1
voters from the first group. This instance
is depicted in the upper row of Figure 9.
In the first round, candidate cm gains
n
2m−1
points, c1 gains
n
2m−1
points, . . ., cm−1 gains
n
2
points. The removed candidate is c1, due to the lexicographical tie-breaking. In the second
round, all the voters who voted in the first round for c1 vote for cm (as their distance to cm is
1 while the distance to c2 is 2, and other candidates are farther than c2). Hence, cm gains in
total n
2m−2
points and the number of points of other candidates do not change. The removed
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candidate is c2 with
n
2m−2
points. In the next rounds, the removed candidates are respectively
c3, . . . , cm, and all their points are always transferred to cm. The winner of the election is cm,
and the optimal candidate is c1. Since c1 is acceptable for n voters, and cm only for
n
2m−1
, we
get the distortion of 2
m−1−1
2m−1
.
Now, let us construct a globally consistent instance from Em−2. We have C = {c1, . . . , cm},
cm <lex c1, . . . , cm−1, and all the candidates except for c1 are vertices of a regular (m − 2)-
simplex in Rm−2; c1 is located in the circumcenter of the simplex—let us denote this point
as O and the length of the circumradius of this simplex as R. The voters are divided into m
groups (g1, . . . , gm) as follows: g1 consists of
n
2m−1
voters and is associated with the pointO; for
i > 1, gi consists of n/2m−i voters and is associated with the point in the middle of the segment
between ci and O (the distance from gi to c1 equals the distance from gi to ci and equals R/2).
The acceptability radius for each voter is equal to R/2. The example of this instance for m = 4
is presented in the lower row of Figure 9.
For i > 1, every voter from gi accepts only ci and c1. For each j 6= 1, i, consider the
triangle {ci, cj, gi}. Recall that for any regular k-simplex with the edge length equal to 1 the
circumradius is equal to
√
k
2(k+1)
, which is strictly less than 1. From this formula we obtain that
R < d(ci, cj). Hence, from the triangle inequality we have that:
d(gi, cj) ≥ d(ci, cj)− d(ci, gi) = d(ci, cj)−
R
2
>
R
2
Hence, cj is not acceptable for gi. Voters from g1 accept only c1 (as d(g1, c1) = 0 and for each
i > 1 d(g1, ci) = R).
From the symmetry of the construction, we have that for each i > 1, all the candidates
except for c1 and ci are in the same distance from gi. Hence, we can assume that voters from gi
have ranking ci ≥ c1 ≥ cm ≥ c2, . . . , cm−1
STV applied to this rule gives exactly the same result as for the previous instance. We
eliminate respectively candidates c1, c2, . . . , cm−1—and all the voters who voted for ci in the
ith round, transfer their vote to cm. Hence, finally cm will be selected as the winner (accept-
able only for voters from gm), while c1 is the optimal candidate (acceptable for all the voters).
Consequently, we get the distortion of 2
m−1−1
2m−1
.
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